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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 
IGNACIO CARLOS FLORES- : 
FIGUEROA, :
 Petitioner :
 v. : No. 08-108 
UNITED STATES. : 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 Washington, D.C.
 Wednesday, February 25, 2009
 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 
argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 
at 11:12 a.m. 
APPEARANCES: 
KEVIN K. RUSSELL, ESQ., Bethesda, Md.; on behalf of
 the Petitioner. 
TOBY J. HEYTENS, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
 behalf of the Respondent. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S
 (11:12 a.m.)
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear 
argument next in Case 08-108, Flores-Figueroa v. United 
States.
 Mr. Russell.
 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
 MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 
please the Court:
 In common usage, to say that somebody 
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses something is to 
say that that person knows what it is that he is 
transferring, possessing, or using. If I say that John 
knowingly used a pair of scissors of his mother, I am 
saying not simply that John knew that he was using 
something which turned out to be his mother's scissors 
or even that John knew he was using scissors which 
turned out to be his mother's, I am saying that John 
knew that the scissors he was using belonged to his 
mother.
 The same principle follows under the Federal 
aggravated identity theft statute, which calls for a 
two-year mandatory sentence for anyone who, during and 
in relation certain predicate offenses --
3
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JUSTICE ALITO: Doesn't that depend on the 
context? You could think of examples where you have 
exactly the same usage and the person wouldn't 
necessarily know about the ownership of the thing in 
question?
 MR. RUSSELL: I haven't been able to think 
of one. The government hasn't been able to come up with 
one.
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, how about so 
and so stole the car that belonged to Mr. Jones?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose you could 
say that -- that the person knew it was Mr. Jones's car, 
but more likely somebody stole the car that turned out 
to be Mr. Jones's.
 MR. RUSSELL: I do think that that 
formulation gives rise to a little bit more ambiguity in 
that context. I think, though, if you said "stole the 
car of Mr. Jones," it's -- it's not particularly 
ambiguous. At the very least, this is a formulation 
that I think --
JUSTICE SCALIA: He says he knowingly stole 
the car that belonged to Mr. Jones. Wouldn't that be 
the parallel?
 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, I'm sorry if I left that 
4
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part out.
 JUSTICE SCALIA: You left out the 
"knowingly."
 MR. RUSSELL: Yes.
 JUSTICE SCALIA: Once you put in 
"knowingly" --
MR. RUSSELL: I think if the statement is, 
you know, John knowingly stole the car of Mr. Jones, 
that strongly implies that John knew that the car 
belonged to Mr. Jones.
 JUSTICE ALITO: I repeat, doesn't that 
depend on the context? You say -- somebody says to you, 
you know a car was stolen from our street last night? 
Oh, what car was stolen? Oh, it was the car of Mr. 
Jones. He knowingly stole the car of Mr. Jones. It 
doesn't necessarily mean that the person who stole the 
car knew that it was Mr. Jones's car.
 MR. RUSSELL: I do think that the 
formulation that John knowingly stole the car of Mr. 
Jones most naturally is understood to imply that John 
knew whose car it was he was stealing.
 We don't claim that the government's 
interpretation is grammatically impossible. We are just 
simply saying that, by far the most common usage of this 
kind of formulation, particularly in a criminal statute, 
5
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is that the knowledge element applies to the --
JUSTICE ALITO: Who did the mugger mug? He 
mugged the man from Denver. You think that he knowingly 
mugged the man from Denver. You think that means that 
the mugger knew that the man was from Denver?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think that that's a more 
ambiguous statement.
 JUSTICE ALITO: Why is it more ambiguous?
 MR. RUSSELL: Because I think the "from" 
preposition --
JUSTICE ALITO: Why is it less unambiguous? 
I thought your argument was that this was unambiguous.
 MR. RUSSELL: I think the possessive form 
makes it, through common usage, unambiguous. We don't 
claim that it's grammatically impossible. But we do 
think that in ordinary usage people would understand 
that --
JUSTICE BREYER: Well, so what if it isn't? 
I mean, suppose you had a statute, and the statute says 
it is a crime to mug a man from Denver. That's a Denver 
ordinance, by the way --
(Laughter.)
 JUSTICE BREYER: -- because no one else 
would pass it. But I mean, if those are the elements of 
the crime, I guess, we do normally apply "knowingly" to 
6
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each of them.
 MR. RUSSELL: That -- that is correct. In 
the criminal --
JUSTICE BREYER: Whether -- even if it isn't 
ordinary usage.
 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. We have more 
than one argument. We think that as a matter of 
ordinary usage --
JUSTICE BREYER: I was slightly trying to 
push you on to the next argument.
 (Laughter.)
 MR. RUSSELL: Well, we do think that, in a 
criminal statute, you ordinarily assume -- this Court 
has said that a conventional mens rea element extends to 
all of the elements of the offense.
 And Congress knows how to deviate from that 
when it wants to. It did so, for example, in the 
statute that the Court construed in the X-Citement Video 
case, where it referred to a person "knowingly" 
transporting a visual depiction, comma, "if" that visual 
depiction had certain characteristics. And this Court 
recognized that that kind of formulation most naturally 
is read to end the knowledge requirement at the "comma, 
if."
 Congress didn't do that here. In fact, 
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there is no textual indication that would lead one to 
believe that the -- it intended anything other than a 
completely conventional mens rea requirement in this 
case.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Russell, am I correct 
in understanding that the government goes with you 
almost all the way, and its only the last three words, 
"of another person," that -- they agree "knowingly" 
applies to "without lawful authority" and that it 
applies to "a means of identification"? You have to 
know that it what you're using is a means of 
identification.
 MR. RUSSELL: As I understand it, that is 
not their position. That's the back-up to their back-up 
position. The first position is that it only applies to 
the verbs, and then they say, well, if you don't accept 
that, well, maybe it goes through "without lawful 
authority." And if you don't accept that, then maybe 
then it goes halfway through the phrase "means of 
identification of another person."
 So, they do raise all three alternatives. 
That last argument, I think, fails both for text --
common usage reasons and in light of this tradition that 
we've been discussing. Textually, there is simply no 
textual cue that the knowledge requirement stops halfway 
8
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through the direct-object phrase, "means of 
identification of another person."
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is the first -- this 
alien's first effort to get papers that would qualify 
for him, if I -- if I remember correctly, the first time 
around he used an assumed name, not his own name.
 MR. RUSSELL: That's correct.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: He used a false date of 
birth. He got a Social Security card that happened to 
belong -- to be the number of no live person.
 MR. RUSSELL: Correct.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And -- and that would not 
have violated. Even in the government's reading, that 
would not have violated --
MR. RUSSELL: That's right.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- this statute.
 But the second time around, your case, he 
did use his own name. And the question was -- and it 
turned out that both the Social Security card and the 
alien registration, they were two different people, but 
they were both alive.
 MR. RUSSELL: Correct.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that does make it a 
crime. But when the number turned out to be -- not 
belong to anybody, then it's not -- you don't get the 
9
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two-year add-on?
 MR. RUSSELL: Just to be clear, the only 
reason the government alleges that there is a crime here 
is because it turned out that those numbers had been 
assigned to somebody else. Under our view, that's not 
enough. That's enough to show that he committed the 
predicate offenses, and he received very substantial 
punishment for that, but it's not enough to show that he 
was qualified for an additional two years' mandatory 
sentence as an aggravated identity thief.
 Now, you can --
JUSTICE ALITO: What would happen if the --
the defendant doesn't -- doesn't act knowingly as to the 
question whether the identifying information belongs to 
a real person but is simply reckless as to whether the 
identifying information belongs to a real person? 
Suppose that someone buys an identification card and 
looks at it, and it looks like it might be a real 
identification card on which that person's picture has 
been inserted in place of the real picture, but the 
person can't be sure. It might really be an entirely 
fake card. Would that be a violation?
 MR. RUSSELL: Ordinarily, recklessness 
doesn't satisfy a knowledge requirement. Willful 
blindness ordinarily does. But recklessness in itself 
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ordinarily does not.
 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Would it be enough to go 
to the jury on the hypothetical Justice Alito gives you?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think so. The government is 
free to present circumstantial evidence.
 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You agree that you could 
go to the jury whenever there is an identity card that 
does reflect the identity of a real person but there's 
no other knowledge that the government's case has 
introduced that shows -- there's no other evidence that 
the government has introduced showing knowledge?
 MR. RUSSELL: If there's -- I think that 
could be a component of a circumstantial evidence case. 
I don't think it would be enough, particularly in a case 
like this, where --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose I had five 
different cards with five different real people. Would 
that be enough to go?
 MR. RUSSELL: I don't think so in itself. 
Precisely -- particularly in a case like this, where the 
person gets up and testifies that they didn't know. The 
fact that there's these numbers here --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. No. The fact that 
he testifies -- that doesn't have anything to do with 
whether or not the case would go to the jury. Does the 
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government make its case sufficient to resist a 
motion -- a directed motion for acquittal if it just 
puts in the fact that you have five identity cards and 
there are five different people that are all real 
people?
 MR. RUSSELL: No, I don't think so. And in 
fact, the fact that there are five different people 
probably tends to undermine the evidence.
 JUSTICE SCALIA: You are making it very hard 
for me to vote with you, I must say. I --
(Laughter.)
 MR. RUSSELL: Well --
JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought you had a pretty 
good -- a pretty good case, but if you are going to say 
somebody who has five identity cards, faces of 
individuals -- I mean, presumably they are real 
individuals.
 MR. RUSSELL: I'm sorry. I may be 
misunderstanding the hypothetical --
JUSTICE SCALIA: That was -- that was the 
hypothetical. Five different -- a person has five 
identity cards of real people, and -- and you don't know 
that he knows that it's the identity card of a real 
person, but he used it.
 MR. RUSSELL: Okay. If they -- these are 
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identity cards that have the picture of somebody other 
than him on them --
JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes.
 MR. RUSSELL: -- which is an unusual 
thing --
JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course.
 MR. RUSSELL: -- to try to use, but if 
that's the case, then, yes, I think that -- you know, 
that if there would be -- affirms that that picture 
belongs to the person whose number is there, then they 
could do that. The ordinary --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. You have to have 
the further inference that he knows that.
 MR. RUSSELL: I think that a jury could 
reasonably infer that the person wouldn't -- would not, 
that if you have an ID card with somebody else's name, 
somebody else's number, somebody else's picture, that 
that belongs to somebody else.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's not -- that's not 
this case. In this case, he had his own name. And I 
don't know whether there was a picture on the alien 
registration card. I don't know if he -- he used his 
own name. Did he use his own photograph?
 MR. RUSSELL: I don't know the answer to 
that question. I mean, Social Security cards don't have 
13 
Alderson Reporting Company 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Official - Subject to Final Review 
pictures.
 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That was going to be my 
next question. So the next question is, suppose it's 
the Petitioner's own name but somebody else's number.
 MR. RUSSELL: I would tend to think that 
that's not sufficient. Of course --
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, that --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Even if he had five 
different cards, all with his name, but all with the 
identification numbers of other real people?
 MR. RUSSELL: Again, I would think not. I 
can understand that people could disagree with that. 
And, of course, the government is free to raise those 
kinds of arguments in other cases where this comes up.
 All of this goes the question of what does 
it take to show that somebody knows something. The 
question before the Court right now, and the only 
question, is whether the government has to show that 
knowledge at all. And in this case, you know, the 
government's principal argument, I think, their 
strongest argument, is that reducing the mens rea 
requirement in that way serves the purpose of 
facilitating prosecutions and therefore protection of 
victims.
 And we don't deny that it has that effect. 
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And we don't deny that this statute is directed at 
protecting victims, but that could be said of an awful 
lot of criminal statutes.
 JUSTICE ALITO: What if the defendant 
chooses a name -- uses a name other than his or her own 
name -- gets an identification card made up with that --
and doesn't know for sure that the name that's chosen 
actually belongs to another person, but because it's not 
an extremely uncommon name, has -- knows that it's 
virtually certain that that name belongs to some other 
person who is unknown to him?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think --
JUSTICE ALITO: Is that a violation?
 MR. RUSSELL: Again, you have this issue of 
recklessness versus knowledge. If he knew that in fact 
it belonged to -- if he used John Doe -- and, in fact, 
it turns out there are several hundred John Doe's in 
this country, and it does raise a difficult question 
about how this statute ought to apply when you are using 
something that is so commonly identifying somebody, but 
it's hard to say that it's identifying anybody in 
particular.
 The definition of "means of identification" 
in the statute says it has to be a name or number that 
is capable of identifying a specific person. And so I 
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think you get into questions, when you're talking about 
common names, about how the statute -- whether the 
statute would be satisfied in that respect.
 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, what if it's not an 
extremely common name, but not an extremely uncommon 
name? And what if it's -- what if the defendant chooses 
Kevin K. Russell? Would that be a violation?
 MR. RUSSELL: You would have to show that he 
knew that that was a name belonging to a specific 
person.
 JUSTICE ALITO: He had -- he would have to 
know that there is such a person?
 MR. RUSSELL: He would have to know that 
there is such -- he wouldn't have to know me, but he 
would have to know that there is such a person. But 
again --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Does he have to know it's 
that -- but suppose he uses John Smith. Does it suffice 
that -- do you have to show that he knows there is a 
John Smith in the phone book, someplace in the United 
States?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think so. I don't think 
he'd have to know who that John Smith was, but he'd have 
to know there is a John Smith. And that -- I mean, that 
kind of scenario does raise difficult questions about --
16 
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JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I want an answer to 
the question.
 MR. RUSSELL: Well, I think the answer is 
the one that I gave you, which I think is disputable, 
but it's -- the answer is yes, he has to know that there 
is a specific person named John Smith.
 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And it can't be submitted 
to the jury on the ground that anybody knows there's a 
John Smith?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can -- can it go to the 
jury without any other evidence, other than the fact of 
his possessing the card?
 MR. RUSSELL: If it's a sufficiently common 
name that he ought to know that there is somebody 
bearing that name, then yes, I would agree that it could 
go to the jury on that.
 JUSTICE SOUTER: If the name were Anthony 
Kennedy, would that go to the jury?
 (Laughter.)
 MR. RUSSELL: I -- again -- it's hard to 
draw lines here, but I think the ultimate question is, 
you know, could a reasonable jury think that somebody 
using that name has to know that there is a person with 
that name, a specific person with that name? And quite 
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possibly they could.
 JUSTICE SOUTER: Can you give me an example? 
It go to the jury, wouldn't it?
 MR. RUSSELL: An awful lot of name examples 
would. I think simply in this case, though, when you 
are talking about a number -- I don't think -- it's a 
much harder case to say that simply having a number on a 
card should -- should lead you to know that that name 
very likely belongs to somebody else. In fact, there 
are nine -- there are -- there a billion possible 
combinations for security -- Social Security numbers, 
and only about 400 million have been issued. But to get 
back -- I --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But if you say this goes 
to the jury, it doesn't leave very much to your 
knowledge argument.
 MR. RUSSELL: Well --
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, I suppose that 
defense counsel could get up and say, the government 
hasn't shown that he knew this. And then the government 
says, of course, he knows this. I don't think you have 
accomplished very much.
 MR. RUSSELL: Well, it -- I think the jury 
still has to make the finding that he knew it. And in a 
case like this, where my client testified that he didn't 
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know it, where the government didn't contest that, 
didn't argue that there were circumstantial evidence 
showing that he did know it, it's going to be 
outcome-determinative. In that --
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How do these operations 
work? When he went to Chicago to buy false 
identification papers, did the first time -- did he go 
to the same outfit as the time he used a false name?
 MR. RUSSELL: The record doesn't disclose 
that, and I don't know.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: These are --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Can I --
JUSTICE GINSBURG: These are outfits that 
specialize in making false identifications?
 MR. RUSSELL: Again, the record doesn't 
disclose how sophisticated the operation was. In this 
case, it could just be, you know, a guy who does this; 
it could be a very sophisticated operation. I think 
it's kind of all over the place out there, in the real 
world.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you have any sense 
of -- because there are many people with false 
identification papers -- how many times it turns out to 
be the number of a live person, and how many times it 
turns out like it was in the first instance in this 
19 
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case: It's just a number, a made-up number that doesn't 
belong to anybody?
 MR. RUSSELL: I'm afraid I don't have a good 
sense of that.
 But just to be clear, in addition to being 
able to just say on the face of the fact about the 
identification that the government can present 
circumstantial evidence to the jury, in a great number 
of cases, particularly the kinds that Congress was most 
concerned about, the way that they -- the defendant 
obtained the identification and the way that they used 
it provides powerful circumstantial evidence of 
knowledge.
 Somebody who breaks into a computer system 
or unauthorizedly uses access to a computer system or 
goes dumpster diving looking for IDs obviously knows 
that they are going to end up with an ID that belongs to 
another person. And if they use the ID to try to get 
into a real person's bank account, then it's awfully 
good information that they were aware that that was an 
ID that belonged to another person, because there's no 
sense in trying to break into the bank account of a 
nonexistent person.
 And so we don't think that this is a case in 
which the government faces some kind of insurmountable 
20 
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burden in proving knowledge in a way that's particularly 
different than -- than other kinds of situations in 
which the law commonly requires the government to prove 
what a defendant knew or didn't know.
 To get back to the victim-focused nature of 
this, you know, Congress could -- we don't dispute that 
Congress could make a policy judgment that it would be 
good to hold defendants strictly liable when they used 
an identification that turns out to belong to somebody 
else. Sometimes the law does that, most commonly with 
respect to sentencing enhancement provisions of the sort 
that the government points to with respect to drug 
quantity or selling drugs in a school zone.
 But when Congress makes that choice, 
Congress makes that clear in the text of the statute. 
And so if you look at the drug quantity or the school 
zone provisions, which are in appendix E and D of the --
of the yellow brief appendix, in appendix D you see that 
Congress establishes in subsection (a) of that provision 
the "unlawful act," and it says it's unlawful for any 
person "knowingly to manufacture, distribute," et 
cetera, a controlled substance.
 It includes in that provision a knowledge 
requirement, which, by the way, nobody thinks means only 
that the government has to show that they knowingly 
21 
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manufactured something which turned out to be a 
controlled substance. Everybody agrees that the 
knowledge requirement in that position extends to the 
direct object phrase, "controlled substance."
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but that's --
that doesn't help you much because it can't be 
"knowingly manufacture" something is the crime. I mean, 
you do have to go on to have that make any sense. You 
don't have to go on to make your provision make any 
sense, that he knowingly, you know, uses a means of 
identification.
 MR. RUSSELL: I disagree as matter of common 
usage. But I think when Congress intends to have a 
statute read that way or writes a statute that looks 
like this one, which in subsection (b) lays out the 
facts that are aggravating, that they are going to 
punish separately, the drug quantity in subsection (b) 
of 21 U.S.C. 841 --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, I -- I guess 
maybe this was what I was trying to say earlier as well. 
I mean, you have in your statute, in between there, the 
modifier "without lawful authority."
 MR. RUSSELL: That's right.
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So that means that 
it can stop at a lot more number of earlier places than 
22 
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can the statute that you were just citing in appendix D.
 MR. RUSSELL: Well, to answer that question 
-- and then I'd like to return to the school zone 
example -- the fact that Congress put in "without lawful 
authority" and enclosed it with commas I think simply 
reflects that Congress understood that, by inserting 
that phrase between transitive verbs and the direct 
object, it was interrupting the natural flow of the 
sentence. And I don't think it means -- so the first 
comma may tell the reader to pause, but the second comma 
I think just as clearly indicates to the reader that the 
flow of the sentence continues.
 And so that I don't think you would say a 
sentence that says, John knowingly used without 
permission a pair of scissors of his mother's. You 
would still read that to mean that John knew that the 
scissors he was using belonged to his mother. That the 
insertion of the parenthetical, I think, indicates that 
Congress knew it could put it at the end and not change 
the meaning or put it here.
 But when Congress intends to write a statute 
that -- that holds people strictly liable for 
aggravating circumstances or writes something like the 
federal quantity provisions where, in subsection (b), 
Congress sets out the punishment that is deserving 
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because of that aggravating factor, and it does not 
include a mens rea requirement in subsection (b).
 And in the school zone provision, Congress 
likewise has no mens rea requirement with respect to the 
knowledge of the person being in a school zone.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about the 
government's argument in this case that Congress was 
really going after people who have false identifications 
because of its concern to protect the victim, that is, 
the person whose number is misused? So the government 
is urging that we take a victim-centered approach to the 
statute.
 MR. RUSSELL: I do think it's a fair point, 
that this is a statute that's concerned with victims. 
Lots of criminal statutes are. But we don't ordinarily 
read it -- Congress doesn't ordinarily enact even 
victim-focused statutes without mens rea requirements, 
and courts don't ordinarily narrowly construe them, even 
though it's true that omitting mens rea requirements or 
narrowly construing them furthers the purpose of 
protecting victims. In fact, by far more -- far more 
commonly, as the LaFave treatise that we cite to you 
explains, we don't hold defendants criminally strictly 
liable for all of the consequences of their crimes. It 
gives the example of somebody who breaks into a house 
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intending to rob it and accidentally sets it on fire --
you know, they're engaged in unlawful conduct to start 
with and so they're not fully blameless, but nonetheless 
we don't hold them criminally liable for arson because 
they didn't intend it.
 Now, Congress could make a choice. Congress 
could choose to hold that arsonist strictly liable -- or 
the robbery suspect strictly liable for the arson, just 
as Congress could hold defendants like Petitioner 
strictly liable for the fact that he ends up using an 
identification that belongs to somebody else.
 But our point is simply there are reasons 
why Congress might not do that, including the anomalous 
kind of penalties that end up being meted out here, 
where you have people -- two people with identical 
culpability ending up with substantially different 
punishments, or people with substantially different 
culpability ending up with identical punishments.
 If you have the classic aggravated identity 
thief who breaks into a bank account using a means of 
identification he knows belongs to somebody else, it's 
exactly the same sentence, under the government's view, 
as somebody like Petitioner who just unknowingly used a 
number in order to get a job.
 Now, it's not impossible that Congress could 
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make that policy choice, but when it does, it tends to 
write statutes that look very different than this. It 
writes ones that look like the quantity statute that I 
just cited or the school zone statute.
 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It's not a clear statute. 
What -- what if the accused knowingly uses a card --
identity belonging to a dead person? Is that a real 
person?
 MR. RUSSELL: I think that's an open 
question in the circuits. Some circuits have said that 
it has to be a means of identification belonging to a 
living person, but that's -- that's not settled.
 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What is your view?
 MR. RUSSELL: My view -- I mean, the statute 
says "of another person." I think you would ordinarily 
presume that to mean a live person. But ultimately, I 
guess, it really doesn't matter to the outcome of my 
case.
 JUSTICE STEVENS: Well, it does, though, in 
a way, because I understand your theory is there are two 
basic kinds of crimes. You just use the document for 
your own source if you want to get the job or you want 
entry into the country or something like that. That's a 
minor crime. But if you are -- it's identity theft 
where you are pretending to be somebody else so you can 
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get advantage of his credit and his assets and his 
access to computers. That's a much more serious crime.
 Now, if it's a dead person, it seems to me 
to be in the former category, rather than in the latter.
 MR. RUSSELL: That's true. Certainly, using 
the identification of a dead person doesn't impose the 
kind of harms on real victims that Congress seemed to be 
most focused on in this case. And certainly, our 
interpretation of the statute we don't think unduly 
interferes with that protective function, precisely 
because the government ought to, in a great many cases, 
very easily show that the way that the person used the 
means of identification shows that they knew that it 
belonged to somebody else.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: This -- this conduct 
would amount to identity -- what did it say -- is there 
a crime of identity fraud?
 MR. RUSSELL: Well, that's what we have been 
using to refer to the underlying predicate offense here, 
which is the misuse of the immigration document. But 
that's -- that applies whenever somebody uses an 
immigration document -- and there is another statute for 
Social Security cards -- that doesn't belong to them. 
And the government only has to prove that they knew that 
it didn't belong them. And that in itself is a 
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substantial protection for people who might be unknowing 
victims or victims of somebody like my client. He is 
substantially deterred from risking their credit by the 
mere fact that he is going to face a substantial penalty 
for using the false document in and of itself. My 
client's --
JUSTICE GINSBURG: It would be equally false 
if the Social Security number were fictitious -- it 
didn't belong to --
MR. RUSSELL: Didn't belong to anybody. 
That's correct.
 If I could reserve the remainder of my time.
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. 
Russell.
 Mr. Heytens.
 ORAL ARGUMENT OF TOBY J. HEYTENS
 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
 MR. HEYTENS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 
please the Court:
 It is common ground that there are at least 
three preconditions to liability under 18 U.S.C. section 
1028A(a)(1): First and foremost, the defendant must 
commit one of the separate predicate felonies that are 
specifically enumerated in subsection (c). Second, 
during the commission of that felony, the defendant must 
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use something that is in fact a means of identification 
of another person. And, third, that use of the means of 
identification of another person must itself be without 
lawful authority and must have the effect of 
facilitating the defendant's commission of the 
underlying predicate felony.
 The question in this case is whether the 
government must also show that the defendant was 
specifically aware that the means of identification that 
he uses to facilitate his underlying crime was that of 
another person. And the answer to that question is no.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Heytens, did the 
prosecutor give the right answer to Judge Friedman in 
the district court when Judge Friedman asked: Where I 
take two people and one of them gets a false Social 
Security card and it happens that the number belongs to 
no live person, and another person goes to the same 
outfit, but the card that he gets does belong to a live 
person -- he doesn't know in either case -- did the 
prosecutor give the right answer when he said, when it 
turns out to be a fictitious number, no two-year add-on; 
but if it turns out to be a real number, two years' 
mandatory addition? The prosecutor said, yes, that's 
the difference. Was that the right answer?
 MR. HEYTENS: Yes, it was. If I could 
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explain, the first -- the reason that the first 
defendant is not guilty, is that it is an absolute 
precondition for liability under this statute that the 
means of identification in question be that of another 
person.
 So there are no victimless violations of 
1028(a)(1), because if we are having this conversation 
at all, there was a real victim involved in the case. 
The reason the second individual is --
JUSTICE ALITO: If I could just interrupt 
you, why does "of another individual" -- why can't that 
be read to mean "of a person other than the person who 
is using the identification," whether this other person 
is real or not?
 MR. HEYTENS: Justice Alito, I think the 
answer to that relates to the definition of "means of 
identification," which is reproduced in the appendix to 
our brief -- I believe at 4a. That's 18 U.S.C. 
1028(d)(7). The definition of "means of identification" 
means "any name or number that may be used, alone or in 
conjunction, to identify a specific individual." And we 
understand that, especially in conjunction with the 
words "of another person," to require, at least under 
1028A(a)(1), that we have to be talking about a real 
individual. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Heytens, this raises 
the question I was talking to your opponent about. Do 
you think that Congress intended there to be a more 
severe punishment for somebody who really steals another 
person's -- knowingly steals somebody else's identity so 
he can cash in on his credit and so forth? It seems to 
me, arguably, that's the important difference.
 MR. HEYTENS: Justice Stevens, I agree that 
a person who deliberately sets out to misappropriate the 
identity of a known individual is almost certainly more 
culpable than someone who does not do it but 
inadvertently does so.
 But I don't think that is controlling in 
this case for a very important reason, and the very 
important reason -- again, to go back to what I said at 
the outset -- is we are not having this conversation 
unless the defendant has already committed a predicate 
felony, and he is subject to punishment for that 
predicate felony. For example, in this case, the 
predicate felony subjected Mr. Flores-Figueroa to a term 
of up to 10 years of imprisonment, above and beyond the 
2 years.
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, but I think --
I thought that argument cut against you, because what 
you are saying is everybody is on the hook. There's a 
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basic problem here, which is -- I'll call "identity 
fraud" -- and yet you get an extra two years if it just 
so happens that the number you picked out of the air 
belongs to somebody else.
 MR. HEYTENS: I understand how, from the 
defendant's perspective -- to use the Justice -- the 
example that Justice Ginsburg used as well, but it may 
seem from the defendant's perspective that he just so 
happened to take a real person's number. But I think 
the critical fact here is that it's not seen that way 
from the perspective of the real individual whose number 
he ended up using. And I think that's the critically 
important fact.
 JUSTICE BREYER: Why? Because that's what 
we normally bring into sentencing. I mean, normally, in 
that we don't impose mandatory -- we impose mandatory 
sentences when the person does something, you know, 
that's wrong and he knows it's wrong.
 When -- when harm occurs, and the harm 
wasn't known or intended, you can take care of it if you 
are a judge. You increase the sentence.
 MR. HEYTENS: Well, Justice --
JUSTICE BREYER: What's the problem?
 MR. HEYTENS: Justice Breyer, my answer to 
your question will probably be only of interest to those 
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members of the Court who find legislative history 
probative, but I think for those who do, the very 
significant answer to that is that the one thing the 
legislative history makes very clear is that at least 
some members of Congress believed that judicially 
discretionary sentences before this statute were enacted 
were failing to adequately take into account the harm 
suffered by real victims.
 There's very clear legislative history to 
that effect. The statement that just leaving it up to 
the judge to take into account the impact of --
JUSTICE STEVENS: Does the legislative 
history deal with people who are stealing identities of 
people who have been -- or bilking identities? I think 
that legislative history cuts the other way.
 MR. HEYTENS: I certainly agree, Justice 
Stevens. There's a portion of the House report that 
lists nine specific cases in which Congress -- or some 
members of Congress with the people authored the 
report -- made the judgment that people who had engage 
in the sort of conduct that Congress wanted to reach had 
received short sentences under the previous regime. 
There are nine specific examples given in the House 
report.
 I acknowledge freely that eight of those 
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nine examples very clearly, by the description, involve 
individuals who must have known that they were using --
JUSTICE BREYER: Why not just says "means of 
identification," then? I mean, it's odd to write a 
statute that has elements and you put the word 
"knowingly," and the "knowingly" is supposed to modify 
some elements but not others. I can't think of other 
statutes that do that. There may be some.
 It's pretty peculiar. You could have left 
off the last element. I mean, if you are drafting a 
criminal statute, anyone would know that.
 MR. HEYTENS: There are two responses to 
that, Justice Breyer. First of all, Congress has 
written in some statutes that clearly presuppose that 
"knowingly" doesn't go all the way through, because they 
repeat the knowingly requirement in those statutes.
 For example -- and it's the appendix to the 
reply, appendix G, at page 23a of the appendix to the 
reply brief, that reproduces 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(A), 
which is a statute that repeats a knowingly requirement 
in the text of the statute, which under Petitioner's 
argument doesn't make any sense at all, because you 
would just construe "knowingly" --
JUSTICE BREYER: Give me one where what 
they've done is they have used "knowingly" at the 
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beginning, and there are four elements of the crime, and 
-- I'm not saying there are none, but I'd like to know 
what they are where "knowingly" doesn't modify something 
there is strict liability for.
 MR. HEYTENS: Sure. I'll give you two --
JUSTICE BREYER: That's going to be 
jurisdictional -- probably jurisdictional hooks, like 
Hobbs Act, and there could be -- there could be some. 
But I don't see -- you tell me.
 MR. HEYTENS: I'll give you two. There's 
the statute that's at issue before this Court in 
Morissette v. United States, and there's the statute 
that was construed by the D.C. Circuit in an opinion by 
Justice Ginsburg, in United States v. Chin.
 The statute at issue in Morissette says, 
"knowingly converts to his use anything of value of the 
United States." In Morissette, this Court held the 
defendant had to have knowledge of the facts sufficient 
to make his conduct a conversion. He has to know that 
the property has an owner, that it's not abandoned, and 
he has to know that the owner is not him.
 But the lower courts have uniformly held 
that, under that statute, the defendant does not need to 
know that the property in question belongs to the United 
States. 
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Or take the Chin statute. The Chin statute 
says "knowingly and intentionally" uses, hires, or 
employs a person under the age of 18 to avoid detection 
of a drug trafficking crime.
 In Chin, the D.C. Circuit said -- and every 
other court of appeals to have considered the question 
has said -- the defendant does not need to be 
specifically aware that the individual in question is 
less than 18 years old.
 JUSTICE STEVENS: But the reason for that is 
it's an equally culpable act where you steal something 
off of a field as in Morissette. I agree the Morissette 
case supports you, even though they relied on it, which 
is interesting to me. But that's a -- you are 
distinguishing between two equally culpable acts. It 
doesn't even make any difference whether he knows the 
owner was some private farmer or the United States.
 In this case, you've got two really big 
categories of different crimes, and to say they are 
treated alike is the thing that troubles me here.
 MR. HEYTENS: Justice Stevens, I agree that 
Mr. Morissette's culpability, or the hypothetical 
defendant in standpoint of Mr. Morissette, doesn't 
really depend on whether he knows the property belongs 
to the Federal Government or he thinks he is stealing 
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from his neighbor. He is a bad person either way.
 I don't think that's true of the Chin 
statute, though. I think we make a very strong argument 
that someone who deliberately employs someone that he 
has --
JUSTICE BREYER: You can do it --
JUSTICE STEVENS: That's the point.
 MR. HEYTENS: Sure. Under this statute, I 
think the significance is, first and foremost, we are 
not having this discussion unless he has already 
committed an underlying predicate felony.
 JUSTICE BREYER: Even that isn't -- I mean, 
here you're treating it as if it is a separate thing. 
That's fair enough. And what are the words "of another 
person" doing there if really they are not supposed to 
make any difference in terms of mental state?
 MR. HEYTENS: What they are doing there 
is -- this goes back to my point that this is a 
victim-focused statute. What they are doing there is to 
say, this statute does not apply unless the name or 
number in question is actually that of a specific 
individual. Take the --
JUSTICE SOUTER: I can -- I can understand 
your argument if you're saying, look, you can't tell 
simply from the text what the answer is. You can only 
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tell the answer if you say -- know what the answer is if 
you say Congress had victims in mind, and if we are 
going to worry about victims, we are not going to worry 
about -- we are going to take a narrow, rather than a 
broad, view of "knowingly."
 Is that your position? Do you agree that if 
you simply look at the text of this statute without 
considering congressional policy, you don't win?
 MR. HEYTENS: We don't concede that the text 
of the statute alone unambiguously resolves the issue in 
our favor --
JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, but does it -- does 
it even come close to supporting it? I mean, let's 
start out with your analogous position. Your analogous 
position is that the "knowingly" simply refers to the --
the -- the three acts which are specified by which the 
identification can -- can be -- the misidentification 
can be perpetrated.
 Transfers, possesses, or uses. Could 
Congress possibly have said, gee, he might not know that 
he was acting to transfer or to possess or to us? 
That's not a serious possibility. So, "knowingly" has 
to refer to something more than the three possible acts.
 And once you get beyond the three possible 
acts, and you say, well, we're going to draw the line 
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between "without authority" and "another person" -- that 
seems like an arbitrary line. And the arbitrariness of 
the line seems even more obvious when the "without 
lawful authority" is set off as a parenthetical. And 
the real object of the statute -- the real -- the 
operative description is "a means of identification of 
another person."
 That's why, it seems to me that, if you look 
at the text, you could say, well, of course, the 
"knowingly" has got to refer to everything that follows, 
both "lawful authority" and "another person."
 And that's why, it seems to me, if you're 
going to win, you've got to win on the grounds that 
Congress wouldn't have meant what seems so natural, 
because Congress wanted to help victims, not defendants.
 Where am I going wrong there, if I'm going 
wrong?
 MR. HEYTENS: Justice Souter, I -- I think, 
as I said before, we do not contend that this statutory 
text standing along ambiguously supports our position 
and thus terminates the inquiry. And I certainly agree 
that the purpose is an important part of our argument.
 I think there are two important things 
to just unpack briefly -- two of the things you said 
there. Once you extend "knowingly" to -- I think the 
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significance is with the effect of once you extend 
"knowingly," first to "lawful authority" and then to the 
"use of identification." Once you extend it to "without 
lawful authority," any conceivable argument that the 
other side can have about criminalizing innocent or 
inadvertent conduct disappears, because then at that 
point the defendant knows specifically that he is acting 
in manner that is contrary to law.
 And then, second, if --
JUSTICE SOUTER: But Is it worth two years?
 MR. HEYTENS: I think -- I think it is.
 JUSTICE SOUTER: The only thing that we know 
for sure is that Congress said it's not worth two years' 
extra unless that of another person was involved. And 
if that is what is so significant or necessarily 
significant in getting a two-year add-on, then it seems 
reasonable to suppose that Congress thought that the 
state of mind had to touch that.
 MR. HEYTENS: Well, I think, first of all, 
at that point the defendant already has two different 
culpable states of mind: He has the culpable state of 
mind to commit the underlying felony, and he has the 
culpable state of mind with regard to his crime.
 Now, I agree with you, Justice Souter, 
there's arguments you can make both ways as a matter of 
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policy. I think, though, some of the colloquies with my 
colleague on the other side illustrate why Congress 
would have made the decision it did, and it's all of 
those cases where the defendant is reckless, where the 
defendant is willfully ignorant, or the defendant simply 
doesn't know because he --
JUSTICE SOUTER: All Congress has got to do 
is to say "recklessly."
 MR. HEYTENS: It's certainly true that 
Congress --
JUSTICE SOUTER: It's an -- it's an accepted 
term. Every -- well, almost everybody knows what it 
means. There's a model Penal Code standard, and so on. 
All they have to do is put the word "recklessly" in 
there. It would cover every "knowingly" case. It 
wouldn't omit anything that is covered by this, and it 
would solve precisely that problem. And they didn't do 
it.
 MR. HEYTENS: I certainly agree there are 
other ways that Congress could have written the statute 
to make it clear. But I think it -- they could have 
written the statute in a way that would be more clear, 
both that would resolve the case in favor of Petitioner 
and that would resolve the case in favor of us. So I 
don't know how that cuts either way. 
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JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I'll tell you what 
cuts one way or another. I -- I find it -- I find it, 
well, not surprising because I've heard -- I've heard 
the government do it before. You acknowledge that this 
is an ambiguous statute. That -- that on its face, it 
-- it could mean the one thing or the other.
 I would normally conclude from that that we 
apply the rule of lenity. Since it could go either way, 
let's assume that the defendant gets the -- you know, 
the tie goes to the defendant. Why -- why shouldn't I 
resolve it that way?
 MR. HEYTENS: Well, under the rule of 
lenity, Justice Scalia, the tie does go to the 
defendant. But, as the Court has made clear again and 
again, including in its opinion in Hayes yesterday, the 
fact that the statutory text has a certain amount of 
ambiguity isn't "off to the races" we trigger the rule 
of lenity. The rule of lenity --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Should -- should it 
-- is it time to revisit the Court's decision in Hayes?
 (Laughter.)
 MR. HEYTENS: The Court -- what the Court 
said yesterday in Hayes is precisely what it had said 
before in Muscarello. The rule of lenity comes into 
play at the end of the process of statutory 
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interpretation, after you consider text, purpose, 
legislative history, and all other --
JUSTICE BREYER: All that is true, and 
that's actually where I was going. It -- it seems to me 
where the ambiguity is precisely is that none of us 
doubts, I don't think, that what Congress is after with 
this extra two-year mandatory is identity theft.
 And where the argument lies is between, did 
Congress do this by punishing people only who intend to 
engage in identity theft or people who, while not 
intending to do so, have that effect? That's the issue.
 MR. HEYTENS: I think that is the effect.
 JUSTICE BREYER: And I don't think I can 
resolve that one way or the other from anything you have 
said. It's rather hard to say. So, therefore, suppose 
I use the rule of lenity this way, which I am trying 
out, I'm not buying it: In the case of 
mandatory-minimum sentences, there is a particularly 
strong argument for a rule of lenity with bite. And 
that is because mandatory minimums, given the human 
condition, inevitably throw some people into the box who 
shouldn't be there. And if this person should be there 
and we put him outside, the judge could give him the 
same sentence anyway.
 So the harm by mistakenly throwing a person 
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outside the box through the rule of lenity to the 
government is small. The harm to the individual by 
wrongly throwing him into the box is great. The rule of 
lenity is, therefore, limited to a very small subset of 
cases where it has particular force, but this is one of 
them.
 MR. HEYTENS: Justice Breyer, I -- I guess 
what I would say first and foremost is I -- I think that 
would be a fairly significant reconceptualization of the 
purpose of the rule of lenity --
JUSTICE BREYER: That's why I raised it.
 MR. HEYTENS: Right. The Court -- if I 
could just explain why I think that --
JUSTICE SCALIA: You'd have to rename it the 
rule of, you know, who gets hurt the most or something.
 MR. HEYTENS: The rule of mandatory minimums 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Not lenity.
 MR. HEYTENS: The Court has said over and 
over again that the two purposes of the rule of lenity 
are providing fair warning to people before their 
conduct subjects them to criminal punishment and to 
demonstrate a proper respect for the lawmaking powers of 
Congress. I don't think the fact that a statute imposes 
a mandatory minimum triggers either one of those 
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concerns in and of itself.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But what about the -- the 
even division -- I think it's an even division, 3/3 --
is it a 3/3 split? And if you wanted one indication 
that this statute is indeed grievously ambiguous, is 
that that good minds have reached opposite conclusions 
with well-reasoned decisions on both sides. So it seems 
to me that this is a very strong argument that this is 
an ambiguous statute, unusually so.
 And I factor into that the answer that was 
given to Judge Friedman's question, which astonished me 
the first time I read it: That a prosecutor would say, 
yes, the same -- no different degree of culpability. 
One happened to get a fictitious number; the other 
happened to get a real number. Two years for the second 
one. There is no difference at all in the state of mind 
of -- of the two defendants. That's -- that's why I 
think the -- the ambiguity argument is strong. Why in 
the world would Congress want to draw such a line?
 MR. HEYTENS: Well, again, if I could --
there are several things there. If I could start with 
the last one, why would Congress want to draw such a 
line, I think the reason Congress would want to draw 
such a line is for several reasons.
 First and foremost is the fundamentally 
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victim-focused nature of this statute. And I -- I agree 
that, at least on first blush, that Judge Friedman 
colloquy does strike a number of people as implausible.
 But I think if you step back, things like 
that are not uncommon throughout the criminal law. The 
-- the precise same objection could be made to the 
existence of the felony-murder rule. Two people go out 
to engage in precisely the same unlawful course of 
conduct. Neither one of them wants to kill anybody. 
Neither one of them wants anyone to get hurt. In one of 
them the gun goes off, and in one of them the gun 
doesn't go off. And one of them is now guilty of felony 
murder, and the other one is guilty of -- of robbery, 
which is admittedly a serious crime but not as serious 
of a crime as murder. There are other examples of that 
JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes, but in this 
particular case, if you talk about identity theft, it's 
inconceivable that the defendant would not know about 
fact that there's another person involved. And so the 
-- the mens rea issue is easy in this case. The only 
time it's -- it's difficult is when he didn't -- when he 
did not use it for an identity-theft purpose.
 MR. HEYTENS: Well, I think I -- if I 
understand the question correctly, I think there are 
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certainly many cases in which the manner in which the 
defendant uses the means of identification will, itself, 
provide powerful circumstantial evidence that he knows 
there is, in fact, another person. Because otherwise 
the actions won't make any sense.
 JUSTICE STEVENS: And those are the category 
of cases in which Congress wanted to have a more severe 
penalty.
 MR. HEYTENS: I certainly agree that those 
are at least some of the category of cases. I -- what I 
guess I disagree about is that those are the only 
category of cases.
 And if I -- if I could try another tack on 
that, when you -- when you review the House report, the 
legislative history that talks about the reason, the 
background and need for the legislation, Congress 
repeatedly trots out a great many statistics about the 
number of people who are victimized by identity theft, 
the amount of dollar harm that is caused to people and 
businesses by identity theft, and --
JUSTICE STEVENS: And in any of those cases 
did they talk about unknowing identity theft?
 MR. HEYTENS: What I guess I am saying, 
Justice Stevens, is in none of those cases does Congress 
-- when it's trotting out those statistics -- does 
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Congress distinguish between situations in which the 
victim was able to determine whether the defendant knew 
that he existed. I mean --
JUSTICE SCALIA: Is this in the statute?
 MR. HEYTENS: It is not in the text of the 
statute, Justice Scalia.
 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, let's not say 
Congress, then. Does -- does the Committee?
 MR. HEYTENS: The Committee report, I 
apologize, Justice Scalia. The Committee report --
JUSTICE STEVENS: You won't convince Justice 
Scalia of this, but you might convince me.
 (Laughter.)
 MR. HEYTENS: Fair enough. What I'm saying 
is, in the course of talking about the harm suffered by 
victims, the amount of harm, in the course of talking 
about the number of people who report that they were 
victims, there is no distinction made whatsoever based 
on the distinction Petitioner would like to draw. And I 
think there's a very good, practical reason for that. A 
person who discovers that there is a problem with their 
Social Security number having been misused, for example, 
by someone, that person is almost certainly not going to 
be able to figure out whether the person who used their 
Social Security number knows that they exist or not. 
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All they know is that problems are now showing up on 
their credit report. All they know is they are getting 
questions from the Social Security Administration about 
this earned income that they, you know, perhaps haven't 
paid taxes on, for example. The person who is in the 
position of the victim is not well positioned to 
determine how the perpetrator got hold of their 
identifying information.
 If I could go back --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but in that 
case, you tell them, look, the person's got 10 years. 
Right? I mean, if they find the guy, he's going to face 
up to 10 years for identity fraud.
 MR. HEYTENS: He's going to face up to 
10 years, Mr. Chief Justice. I think that's the 
important thing. I think Congress rationally could have 
been concerned that the guy is not actually going to get 
10 years because there was evidence before them that the 
person was not getting 10 years, that the person was 
being, at least in the judgment of some people, not 
receiving sufficient punishment to reflect that, that 
there was a real person who was harmed by the conduct --
that was harmed by the conduct that eventually had an 
adverse impact on him.
 I think that fundamentally was the 
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motivating force behind the statute, the need to have a 
statute that takes adequate and discrete account for the 
presence of a real victim.
 Now, the Petitioner, for example, refers to 
the statement of having met the statute -- excuse me --
as having a mandatory minimum. It's not correct to say 
the statute has a mandatory minimum. This statute has a 
mandatory, discrete, prescribed punishment. It's not 
two years up to something else. It's two years, and 
exactly two years.
 And I think that's highly significant. 
Because I think what it says is that Congress thought 
there was a discrete measure of punishment that was 
appropriate to reflect the presence of a real victim. 
The fact that there is a real victim gets you two years. 
You get whatever else you get on your underlying felony, 
which can take into account all sorts of other 
considerations about your crime, but the fact that there 
was a discrete victim is an independent harm to that 
person that should be taken into account in imposing 
criminal punishment.
 JUSTICE SCALIA: You could also say you get 
two years for knowing that there is a discrete victim. 
I mean -- I -- you can describe it either way.
 MR. HEYTENS: You certainly can. 
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JUSTICE SCALIA: And it makes sense either 
way.
 MR. HEYTENS: You certainly can describe it 
either way, but I think in light of the concern that the 
harms to real victims are not being adequately taken 
into account, it doesn't seem to us to make sense to 
make the presence of that additional punishment turn on 
whether the defendant is specifically aware that the 
victim existed, and I think at the end of the --
JUSTICE GINSBURG: You -- you gave earlier 
the felony murder example of the one who -- the gun goes 
off, he didn't mean to kill anybody. But I thought 
homicide is -- it's an answer to your argument that this 
statute is entirely victim-centered, because a person is 
just as dead if he's the victim of a reckless driver as 
a premeditated murder, and yet we certainly distinguish 
the penalties in those cases, no matter that the harm 
was identical.
 MR. HEYTENS: We certainly do, Justice 
Ginsburg, and we don't make the extravagant claim that 
law doesn't look to relative moral culpability in 
assigning criminal punishment. I'm responding to the 
argument on the other side that that's all the law ever 
looks to.
 The law frequently looks to two different 
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things: It looks to relative culpability levels, but it 
also looks at the existence of harm. If you want to 
continue with the homicide example, if you look at moral 
culpability, two people who both intentionally attempt 
to cause the death of another human being without any 
legal excuse for doing so, from a culpability 
standpoint, have engaged in precisely the same level of 
moral wrong, but law treats attempted murder and 
completed murder extremely differently from one another. 
And that's because in one case, as Justice Ginsburg 
points out, you have a real victim. When the person 
dies, there is a discrete level of harm to the victim 
that is not -- that does not occur when, fortunately, 
the person who tries to kill someone else fails.
 And I think, at the end of the day, that is 
the most important issue in this case. You see this 
argument again and again and again, especially in the 
circuits -- let me go back to Justice Ginsburg's point 
about the three circuits that have gone either way.
 First, as a -- as just a threshold matter, 
this Court has said repeatedly that the fact that courts 
have disagreed about the proper interpretation of a 
statute doesn't suffice to trigger the rule of lenity, 
because this Court almost never takes a case where there 
is not a circuit split. And if you said the existence 
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of a circuit split makes the statute ambiguous would 
mean that the criminal defendant wins every time; and 
the Court has not said that.
 But -- but also I think where those courts 
have fundamentally gone wrong is they have essentially 
said, this is a crime about theft; theft requires you to 
know that there's a real owner; if you don't know 
there's a real owner, that's not theft. And I think 
where they went wrong was at the very beginning. Where 
they went wrong at the very beginning is asking the 
question of whether it would be natural to refer to 
someone like Petitioner as a thief.
 We think the more appropriate question, as 
the district court said in Godin, is whether it would be 
at all unusual to refer to the two innocent people whose 
Social Security number and alien registration numbers 
Petitioner used to facilitate his two underlying 
felonies were the victims of identity theft. If --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but the 
problem with that is the statute says "identity theft"; 
it doesn't say anything about victims.
 MR. HEYTENS: It certainty does, Mr. Chief 
Justice, but it says "identity theft"; it says -- not 
"theft," and I think the question is whether you refer 
to those people as having had -- if identity theft 
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occurred in this case. And I think if you look at it 
from the victim's perspective, which is we think the 
perspective that Congress was looking at it from, the 
answer to that question is yes.
 And for that reason we ask that the judgment 
of the Eighth Circuit be affirmed. Thank you.
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
 Four minutes, Mr. Russell.
 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
 I would like to address just a couple of 
quick questions about the text, and then address a 
couple of other issues about the purpose.
 Justice Breyer, you asked if there were 
examples of other statutes in which knowledge 
requirements didn't extend to all the elements. The 
government gave two examples. The first, Morissette, is 
clearly an example with a jurisdictional element. All 
of the circuit courts that say that the knowledge 
requirement doesn't extend to "of the United States" do 
so on the grounds that it's because there's a 
jurisdictional element, and jurisdictional elements 
don't extend -- don't require mens rea.
 With respect to the Chin example, I do 
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acknowledge that there -- there is a decision that this 
Court hasn't reviewed in which the D.C. Circuit said it 
doesn't extend to the age of the victim. That falls 
within a category of special cases where courts have 
treated the victimization of children differently, in 
part because it's so difficult and nearly impossible to 
prove the defendant's knowledge of the age of the 
victim.
 That kind of practical barrier simply 
doesn't exist here for all the reasons we've discussed 
earlier about the government's ability to rely on 
circumstantial evidence to show the defendant's state of 
mind here.
 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There aren't too many 
15-year-olds who look like they're over 21?
 MR. RUSSELL: That's right.
 (Laughter.)
 MR. RUSSELL: That's right. With respect to 
the victim-focused nature of this, again, it's true that 
-- that the criminal law takes into account both 
defendant culpability and harm to victims, but the 
ordinary resolution is to reserve punishment in the 
criminal system for those who intend the harms that they 
inflict.
 There are, of course, exceptions like felony 
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murder. As the LaFave treatise points out, that kind of 
treatment tends to be reserved for serious bodily injury 
or death kinds of harm. And there's no reason to think 
that Congress thought, although identity theft is 
serious, that this fell within that kind of category of 
exceptions. There are of course these other exceptions 
where Congress relies on facts not known to the 
defendant for sentencing enhancement, but as I've 
mentioned earlier, it tends to write those statutes in a 
way that makes clear that those enhancement factors are 
separate and apart from the underlying events, and they 
don't include an express mens rea requirement there. 
And the government hasn't cited any case, any statute 
that looks like this, that has been treated as a 
sentencing enhancement provision.
 Finally, with respect to the rule of lenity, 
the government I think has acknowledged that the 
statutory text is at least ambiguous with respect to 
whether or not it compels their conclusion. They've 
acknowledged that you can make policy arguments both 
ways about what would be a good idea about how to treat 
this kind of conduct. And I think, regardless of your 
view of what the trigger of the rule of lenity is, this 
is a classic case for it.
 If Congress intended the government's 
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interpretation, the government is free to go back to 
Congress, and there's every reason to believe that 
Congress would be receptive. The problem with over-
construing a mandatory sentence or a mandatory minimum, 
as Justice Breyer was alluding to, is that it does have 
this particularly harsh effect, and one that is, as a 
practical matter, hard to undo in the legislative 
process, which as the Court has recognized, is another 
function served by the rule of lenity.
 If the Court has no further questions.
 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
 The case is submitted.
 (Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the case in the 
above-entitled matter was submitted.) 
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